

The 42nd George Ernest Morrison Lecture in Ethnology 1981

# **MOSLEM REBELLION IN CHINA:**

**A Yunnan Controversy**

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# MOSLEM REBELLION IN CHINA:

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and other centres of Moslem resistance, are still known as the 'Grave of Thousands', and the 'Grave of Tens of thousands'. Indeed, in terms both of duration and intensity, this rebellion was undoubtedly one of the most protracted and brutal, not only in nineteenth-century China, but in the whole of Chinese history.

The Yunnan Moslem Rebellion, as you well know, was not the only such upheaval in China during this period. The nineteenth century, marked by the White Lotus Rebellion at the beginning, to the Boxer outbreak at the close, saw China torn by almost continuous uprisings and rebellions at a time when she was also threatened by foreign invasions — the best known of these internal upheavals being the Taiping Rebellion (1849-1864), the Nien Rebellion (1853-1868), the Miao Rebellion (1854-1872), the Moslem Rebellion of the Northwest (1862-1873) and the Yunnan Rebellion. I shall not dwell on the causes common to all these outbreaks, but rather limit myself to some special features of the Yunnan Rebellion and what the present controversy is all about.

To the Chinese, the word 'hui-hui', denoting 'Moslems', does not signify *all* those of the Islamic faith. There are many national minorities in China, especially in Xinjiang province, who practise Islam, yet who are not regarded as 'Hui' people. The term 'hui-hui' applies only to a particular ethnic group of Islamic people. Some of you who have been to Beijing may have been to one of the restaurants that now line one of the city's better-known thoroughfares, Wangfujing Dajie, widely known in former days as Morrison Street, after the celebrated Australian who once lived there. The cooks and waiters in some of these restaurants are indistinguishable in physique, dress and language from the Han Chinese, and you would not know they were Moslems except for a small wooden board hanging outside, with the Chinese words 'hui-hui' or 'Moslems from the Western Regions' in Arabic script. These are the Moslems or Hui people to whom I am referring here; they have become indistinguishable from other Chinese as a result of a long historical process.

Moslems in China are of two origins. By far the largest group to come to China were Central Asians and Near Eastern peoples, such as Persians, Arabs, and others, who arrived in the first part of the thirteenth century in the wake of the Mongol conquest, particularly during the period from Chinggis Khan's invasion in 1219 to Hulegu's occupation of Baghdad in 1258.<sup>6</sup> During this period, various Moslem kingdoms and tribes in the vast territory to the west of the Belaturh Mountains and



east of the Black Sea were brought under Mongol domination. With each conquest, inhabitants in the conquered territory were dispatched *en masse* to the east.<sup>7</sup> With official encouragement, these were later joined by traders, artisans and others. In the official documents of the Yuan Dynasty they were referred to as 'hui-hui', and were listed side by side with other ethnic groups such as Han, Naiman, Uighur, Tangut, Khitan, and so on. In their enforced exile, many of these prisoners enlisted as soldiers, while others worked as artisans and farmers, and a small number became government officials, merchants and preachers. All of them referred to themselves by the term the Mongols used, 'hui-hui'.

The smaller group of Moslems were mostly merchants who had come to China at the beginning of the Tang dynasty in the seventh century. It was recorded by an Arab traveller that there were more than one hundred and twenty thousand Arabs, Persians and Jews living in Canton at the time when Huangchao captured this international port in 879.<sup>8</sup> Despite their long residence in China, the Moslems descended from these West Asian settlers are not regarded as 'hui-hui', nor indeed, did they add significantly to the total Moslem population in China. Equally insignificant are the numbers of Han, Mongol, Uighur, and other ethnic peoples who were converted to the Islamic faith through marriage and other social and economic processes.

Upon the overthrow of the alien Mongol rule in 1368, the Ming rulers ushered in a period of intensive nationalism. Among the first edicts of the first emperor, Daizu, were those proscribing the use of foreign clothing, language and names.<sup>9</sup> In 1372, a proclamation was issued, forbidding intermarriage among the Mongols and their former allied peoples, encouraging instead intermarriage between all these and the Han Chinese, on the ground that they were now all Chinese subjects. The punishment for offenders against such prohibitions was confiscation of property and enslavement.<sup>10</sup> This system of intermarriage not only resulted in the growth of the number of the Chinese Moslems, but also made them increasingly less foreign through their gradual adoption of the Chinese pattern of living, except in the crucial areas of diet and religious practices. Moslems began to adopt monosyllabic Chinese names by selecting certain syllables of their original names; hence Mahammed became Ma, Nasir became Na, Sayed became Sai and so on, in conformity with the traditional Chinese so-called 'one hundred surnames'.<sup>11</sup> They also adopted Chinese dress and gradually



local Chinese dialects began to replace Arabic and Persian, only a few phrases and terms being preserved for use on religious occasions and in speaking among themselves.

When the massive migration from Central Asia took place, the Han Chinese had long been living on the land the Moslems were to settle. The newcomers were therefore unable to congregate in any one place as a single entity, nor were they encouraged to do so.<sup>12</sup> In fact, it was a deliberate policy of the successive dynasties of Ming and Qing to disperse these forced immigrants to localities and regions widely separated from one another, and compel them to live interspersed among Han Chinese and other ethnic groups. This policy was particularly strictly enforced under the Qing dynasty. It was common practice, even after the middle of the last century, to up-root forcibly whole rural Moslem communities and transport them to regions thousands of miles away in complete disregard of environment, climate, living conditions and work opportunities.<sup>13</sup>

But despite these and other repressive measures, the Chinese Moslems always tried wherever possible to keep together and to keep to themselves. This physical separateness, whether in a street, in a city or a village in a rural area, enabled them to retain a certain separate cultural and social identity. One interesting and distinctive feature was that, in order to ensure communication between settlements, Moslems always chose to live by main roads or rivers. Their concentration along the banks of the Grand Canal is a good illustration of this long tradition.<sup>14</sup>

They tended also, by force of circumstance more than by choice, to settle in thinly populated areas. This explains the high percentage of Moslems in the north-western and south-western provinces of China. Before the middle of the last century, the ratio of Moslems to Han Chinese was as high as seven to three in Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai and three to seven in Shaanxi.<sup>15</sup> But these numbers were sharply depleted following the slaughter by the Qing army under Zuo Zongtang during the suppression campaign against the Moslems of the northwest in 1862-1873. After this, Shaanxi ceased to be an area of concentration of Moslem population, which was reduced from an estimate of over one million to some twenty thousand. Zuo Zongtang, whom Morrison and others described as one of the greatest butchers of modern times, even boasted that: 'At present, except for some twenty thousand or so still living in Xian, the whole Moslem population of Shaanxi has been wiped out family by family leaving no heirs to speak of. Nine-tenths of them died by the sword, through epidemic or starvation. It is indeed



the greatest catastrophe for Moslems for more than a thousand years'.<sup>16</sup> According to an estimate made in 1953, the figure for Moslems in Shaanxi was then little more than fifty thousand,<sup>17</sup> or less than 5 per cent of the number of nearly a hundred years before.

The present Moslem population in Yunnan is estimated at a little over two hundred thousand,<sup>18</sup> or about 10 per cent of that before the Rebellion over a hundred years ago. The ancestors of these Moslems went to Yunnan in the thirteenth century under the Mongols as military colonists.<sup>19</sup> It was they who first brought the land under cultivation; and tillers of the soil formed by far the largest component of the Moslem population in Yunnan.<sup>20</sup> As owners of the land, some Moslems also became owners of mines, particularly copper and silver mines.<sup>21</sup> And partly because of their adventurous spirit, many became traders, especially in the caravan trade with Burma which was virtually in their hands.<sup>22</sup> Some of the more successful of these traders reinvested their profits in farmland.<sup>23</sup>

This little bit of background is necessary because although insofar as it was an ethnic conflict, the Yunnan Rebellion was the culmination of an antipathy between Moslems and Han Chinese rooted in long-standing political and economic discrimination, the immediate causes of the spontaneous uprising in 1855 are to be found in disputes involving land, mines and, indirectly, overland trade. As early colonists, the Moslems, naturally enough, established their farms wherever possible within easy reach of the water supply.<sup>24</sup> Moslem traders also invested their profits in such land. This rankled with many Han Chinese who, with their traditional chauvinism, regarded their Moslem compatriots as they would alien intruders, though they themselves were even more recent newcomers to Yunnan.<sup>25</sup> With the connivance or active support of local Han officials, efforts were made to dislodge the Moslems from their possessions, both farming land and mines.<sup>26</sup> This explains why ethnic conflicts occurred more often than not in the fertile plains. In essence the revolts by the Yunnan Moslems were as much a struggle against economic persecution as for ethnic survival.

These features have long been recognised by Chinese historians who, whatever their political persuasion, blamed the Yunnan Rebellion on the Qing government's discriminatory and oppressive racial policy. At first, historians in the People's Republic went even further, and acknowledged the rebel leaders as heroes, awarding them, along with the leaders of other rebellions elsewhere, an honoured place in the pantheon of national worthies.<sup>27</sup>



But all this suddenly changed in 1955, a century after the outbreak of the rebellion. A revised version of the events made by a leading and respected historian of Modern China alleged that the hitherto revered leader of the Yunnan Rebellion, Du Wenxiu, was in fact a traitor. According to this version, the British government, which had been attempting to invade Yunnan by way of Burma since 1858, sent spies to Dali to conspire with Du Wenxiu. In 1871, Du Wenxiu sent his adopted son, Aishan, to London with a view to betraying Yunnan. Making use of the reactionary banner of 'Pan-Islamism', the British government directed Aishan to Turkey to work out the concrete conditions of the betrayal, but thanks to the all-out offensive by the Qing army, the plan was frustrated in time. Du Wenxiu was a Chinese, it is said, yet conspired against the motherland, the province and the different groups of nationalities of Yunnan; so, from the day he colluded with the British aggressors, he was no longer the representative of the forces of a righteous cause, but a traitor to his country and to that cause. The rebel forces had, on this account, been manipulated by Du Wenxiu, if they suffered massacre at the hands of the Qing army, they deserved their defeat — though their fate may deserve our sympathy.<sup>28</sup>

An accusation of this kind is serious at any time. It was unthinkable in the political climate in which it was made. Exhibits in praise of the heroic deeds of the rebels were hastily withdrawn and others with condemnatory labels substituted. Since in China at that time, pronouncements on intellectual affairs made by those in authority were sacrosanct, no defence or refutation, however well documented, was allowed.

I have already contributed something to the debate, and I hope the details of my recent findings will further help towards a solution of this controversy. Since the accusation against Du Wenxiu and the rebellion he led, arose out of the mission to London of his supposedly adopted son, Aishan, I shall now try to examine the evidence upon which this accusation was based.

The Aishan Mission of 1872 is better known as the Panthay Mission, about which a great deal has already been written — 'Panthay' being the term used by the Burmese when referring to Chinese Moslems in Yunnan.<sup>29</sup> The name 'Aishan' is simply the transliteration of Hassan, or Prince Hassan, for it was by this title that British officials in Burma commended to the home government in London a young Chinese Moslem whose otherwise mundane name was Liu Daoheng.<sup>30</sup> One can



only guess at the reasons for this transformation. It may have been that the British officials who sponsored this mission thought it might otherwise sound too ordinary to attract the necessary attention of the men in Whitehall, or indeed even to justify his being despatched all the way to London at official expense. At any rate, until he made his abrupt appearance in government exchanges between Burma, India and London under this ennobled disguise, nothing is known of Liu Daoheng beyond the little that can be gleaned from the records the British in Burma kept and from one document, said to have been a memorial he submitted to Du Wenxiu in October 1870.<sup>31</sup>

In it, Liu is shown to be a self-made man of considerable ambition, who made up for his lack of formal education by his obvious energy and determination. For fifteen years, it appears, he had been constantly on the move, travelling extensively through China's southern and eastern provinces. He witnessed the upheavals brought about by the Taiping and Nien Rebellions, as well as the invasion by Anglo-French forces. He was deeply impressed by these foreign invaders who, having won the war of 1856-1857, had advanced towards the north, stormed and occupied the Chinese capital in 1860 and there imposed on the Chinese government a series of conditions which were henceforth to govern Sino-foreign relations. Viewing the peace treaties between China and the two Western Powers merely as a temporary lull in the ambitions of the Powers, Liu Daoheng now suggested to Du Wenxiu, the Yunnan rebel leader, that he should seize the psychological moment to entice to his side the two Western Powers with their superior modern weapons, and together, overthrow their common enemy, the Qing government. To that end, Liu offered himself as Du Wenxiu's emissary to Britain and France.

Liu's memorial, the gist of which I have just outlined, bears the date October 1870. We do not know when, or even if, the memorial was actually submitted to Du Wenxiu, or the whereabouts of Liu at that time. The document does, however, carry a marginal note, allegedly by Du Wenxiu, praising the author's literary style and presentation of argument which, it avers, could not have been that of an 'ordinary pedantic scholar', and lauding him as 'a rare talent in troubled times'. But it made no comment on the proposal itself. In the memorial, Liu Daoheng explained that he had turned to Du Wenxiu because the man whom he regarded as some kind of adopted father through marriage, Liu Yinchang, another Moslem leader, called Syed Dawood by the British, was too small-minded to entertain his



proposal. This Liu Yinchang, at the time commanded the Moslem stronghold of Wusuo, near the Burmese border, was none other than the rebel leader, who for nine years had held the all-important district of Tengchong (also known by the British as Momien).<sup>32</sup> However that may be, the next time we hear of Liu Daoheng, some ten months after the date of his memorial, he was in Burma as a member of the mission headed by Ma Silong, the father-in-law of Liu Yinchang. The aim of this mission was to seek British support in opening a direct trade route from Burma to Wusuo. The main route via Tengchong had already been rendered precarious by Qing government forces. The negotiations dragged on for some five months without result, so Ma Silong decided to return to Wusuo while Liu Daoheng remained in Burma.<sup>33</sup>

It so happened that at this time, the King of Burma, against the wishes of the British imperial authorities there, was planning to send a mission to Britain.<sup>34</sup> As there was some enmity between the Yunnan Moslems and the King of Burma over Burmese support of the Qing government,<sup>35</sup> the local British authorities, finding themselves unable to stop the Burmese mission, seem to have decided to make use of Liu Daoheng (who had been hanging around and bothering them) to outshine the Burmese by setting him up as the head of a rival mission to London a few days in advance of the others.<sup>36</sup> So, without first informing London or obtaining permission, Liu Daoheng was transformed into Prince Hassan and was hastily despatched to London via Calcutta at the expense of the Government of India, at the head of the so-called Panthay Mission. Leaving Rangoon at the beginning of April the mission duly reached the British capital on the last day of May 1872, four days before the Burmese mission arrived.

London was furious. The Secretary of State for India, the Duke of Argyll, refused to receive the mission, and the British authorities in India and Burma were reprimanded in no uncertain terms for having allowed it to proceed at all, let alone at government expense.<sup>37</sup> The Under-Secretary of State at the India Office was not only instructed to find out the purpose of the mission, but was also charged with getting rid of it. Indeed, the bulk of the archives on this mission is concerned with how best to end it and how to reduce the cost of its upkeep until this could be effected. So annoyed was the Duke that, at his insistence, the total weekly allowance for the whole delegation, which was housed while in London on the attic floor of the Charing Cross Hotel in the Strand, was reduced from £73.16 to £61.8.9.<sup>38</sup>



The quickest way to get rid of these emissaries would have been to send them back the way they had come. But Liu Daoheng, sensing perhaps the government's impatience to see them go, insisted on returning via Turkey at the British government's expense, and the British reluctantly acceded to this request.<sup>39</sup> The Sultan of Turkey, however, also refused to receive the mission. So after two fruitless weeks, the luckless emissaries had to resort to borrowing for their fares to return to Rangoon.<sup>40</sup>

This whole affair, full as it was of comic twists, would have been long forgotten, had it not been for two documents in Chinese left behind with the India Office by Liu Daoheng. The first, purporting to be a letter of allegiance from Du Wenxiu to Queen Victoria, was dated in the lunar calendar month 13 November—11 December 1871 while Liu Daoheng was in Burma and was the letter of accreditation for the two emissaries, Ma Silong and Liu Daoheng, described respectively as Du Wenxiu's wife's uncle and adopted son. But, actually, Ma Silong had gone back to Wusuo and absented himself from the mission; another young Moslem renamed Prince Yussuf by the British unofficially took his place. It was in this letter that Liu Daoheng was described for the first and only time as the adopted son of Du Wenxiu.<sup>41</sup>

The second document, in two parts, is Liu Daoheng's address to the India Office in London. The first part of this second document is a request for British military and financial support, in return for which Liu pledged the allegiance of the Moslem government at Dali. The second part of the document explains the significance of the offering of four cases of Dali marble which were being presented as a token of allegiance. It is on these two documents that the accusation of treason is based.<sup>42</sup>

These incriminating documents are further supported by equally incriminating circumstantial evidence. I have already pointed out that the Yunnan Moslem Rebellion, though ethnically based and inspired, was not a racial conflict. Nor was it a religious one, although religion and the violation of religious practices were an added cause. Economic factors lay at the heart of the conflict. Such being the case, the rebel movement had no binding ideology but only the interests of different localities, which often varied as widely as they were separated geographically. The situation was not unlike that of the Arab countries in the present-day Middle East as I understand it. Though of the same people and of the same faith, ultimately it is individual, tribal and even personal interests which prevail. With the Moslems in Yunnan,



one can go further and say that after centuries of assimilation and absorption what still kept them apart from other Chinese was the economic and political discrimination directed against them. Resentment against this may have been sufficient to kindle a revolt, but not always to sustain it, and certainly not to serve as a durable uniting force for Moslems of different areas. Since economic discrimination was their main grievance, the Moslems were vulnerable to being selectively bought over by the government, and this made it difficult for different districts to preserve any united front. This inability, the most important factor in the rebels' eventual defeat, was becoming apparent when Liu Daoheng wrote to Du Wenxiu.

Furthermore, after centuries of assimilation and Confucian indoctrination, the majority of Yunnan Moslems were very susceptible to government propaganda and its notion of loyalty and treason. So the ethnic element of the Rebellion became a weakness rather than a strength. By making the Moslem rebels out to be an enemy, not just of the government, but of the nation, the government successfully turned the suppression campaign into a racial war. How strong this sentiment about the ethnic element of the Rebellion was can be seen in the fact that some historians still consider as evidence of treason even the alleged existence of the 'Huijiao Guo' — the Islamic Kingdom, or 'Pingnan Guo' — the Kingdom of Southern Tranquility, names given by foreigners to Du Wenxiu's government in Dali.<sup>43</sup>

Du Wenxiu distinguished himself by being the one leader able to see further than local and ethnic interests. He broadened and therefore consolidated the base of the rebel forces under his leadership by enlisting the support of Han Chinese, as well as of other ethnic groups in the province.<sup>44</sup> This explains why his forces were able to continue the struggle for another eleven years after the Moslems everywhere else in Yunnan had either surrendered to or been destroyed by the Qing government forces. The ethnic element in the Rebellion was nevertheless skilfully exploited by the Qing government, to the great detriment of the rebel movement.

Yet another weakness of the rebel forces was that their warfare was defensive rather than offensive. This was because their revolt sprang out of economic grievance, invariably local in nature, and they lacked social and political programmes and objectives such as the Taiping had had. By merely defending themselves locally, they waited to be attacked, and were isolated, weakened and eventually destroyed. In



this way, Liu Daoheng's advocacy of the need to fight the Qing government with a view to overthrowing it, could have appealed to Du Wenxiu.

Liu's proposal could also have made sense to Du Wenxiu for another reason. The two Western Powers, Britain and France, whose support Liu thought desirable, were not only two of the most powerful foreign presences in China, but were also the Powers in control of Yunnan's two foreign neighbours — Burma, and what was to become known as Indo-China. Though Britain's formal annexation of Upper Burma and the war by which France secured Tonkin were not to take place for another fifteen years, their intentions were already as clear as their influence was felt. Yunnan lay across the path to their goal in the interior of China. It was all-important in the schemes of both Western Powers, who were becoming increasingly active when the Yunnan Rebellion broke out. In February 1868, a French party under Captain Garnier visited Du Wenxiu in Dali. It was followed three months later by the visit to Tengchong of a British party led by Captain Sladen. The French had been rebuked by Du Wenxiu, who told them in unambiguous terms that they could do what they liked in Indo-China, but under no circumstances would their aggression be tolerated in Yunnan, or certainly not in that part of Yunnan under his control.<sup>45</sup> This rebuke undoubtedly helped to turn the French against the rebels and induced them to supply the Qing forces with weapons. As for Captain Sladen, he was tactfully stopped from proceeding further than Tengchong.<sup>46</sup>

Dali was still at the height of its power when these foreigners made their appearance, but two years later, when Liu Daoheng made his proposal to Du Wenxiu in October 1870, the situation had completely changed. Soon their territory of forty-one prefectures and districts was to shrink to nine and be hemmed into one relatively poor and mountainous corner.<sup>47</sup> In fact, what may be called the first turning-point of the Rebellion had occurred as far back as 1862 when the rebel forces under Ma Rulong and Ma Dexin had been lured by the Qing government into surrender.<sup>48</sup> Their betrayal made it possible for the government troops to regain control of the vast, rich and strategically vital central plains, cutting once and for all the rebels' lines of communication with Indo-China, whence the French were now pouring in military equipment in support of the government forces and their new Moslem allies.<sup>49</sup> Even more importantly, the Qing government could now not only throw all their military might at the remaining Moslem resistance under Du Wenxiu, but could also make



use of the new Moslem allies. In fact it was they who, now greatly strengthened with foreign weapons, served as the advance guard in the government's attack against their own kind, thus turning what was originally an ethnically inspired struggle into civil strife within the same ethnic group. The government simultaneously achieved its political as well as its military aims in this way. Indeed, desertion from the beleaguered camp of Du Wenxiu became increasingly more frequent from this time on.<sup>50</sup> In such a situation the probability that Du Wenxiu could have changed his mind about contact with the foreign powers and be converted to Liu Daoheng's idea of appealing for foreign aid was, of course, quite high, and if he did, then the mission to London led by Liu Daoheng by way of Burma would be the only course open to him.

I have now set out all the documentary and circumstantial evidence in favour of the treason theory, and it is incriminating evidence indeed. But having examined all this, and also other evidence which I have recently unearthed in the India Office archives in London and elsewhere, I would like to suggest a quite different sequence of events. I will try to show that Liu Daoheng's mission to London was the machination of an ambitious and determined man, that had nothing to do with Du Wenxiu, and even less with the whole Moslem movement in Yunnan. The verdict of treason passed on Du Wenxiu is, in my view, both wrong and unjust.

The story, as I see it, is a simple one. There is no evidence to prove that Du Wenxiu had seen, let alone approved, Liu Daoheng's 1870 memorial. It is certain, however, that Liu Daoheng, after having failed in his mission with Ma Silong in persuading the British authorities in Burma to open a new trade route direct to Wusuo, once more toyed with the proposal he made to Du Wenxiu the previous year, and this happened to fit in with the plans of the British authorities in Burma. So, the so-called letter of allegiance by Du Wenxiu to Queen Victoria was, with its seals and all, manufactured in Burma by Liu Daoheng. This interpretation is clearly borne out by the letter which Liu addressed to the India Office in London; the handwriting in both documents is identical. What is more, there is yet another document in Chinese in the India Office archives, again in the handwriting identical to that of the so-called Letter of Allegiance. It is a letter Liu Daoheng wrote to the Duke of Argyll on his return to Rangoon in February 1873.<sup>51</sup> Liu Daoheng, no longer content with the label of adopted son of Du Wenxiu under which he had gone to London, now assumed the title of the second highest ranking official of the



administration under Du Wenxiu, again with all the necessary seals. He did not know that Du Wenxiu had died by poisoning himself upon the fall of Dali two months previously.

In my view, this is the whole story. I would like, if I may, to take this opportunity to say a word in reply to some of the colleagues I have had the good fortune to meet in my travels outside China. While not disagreeing with my diagnosis of the Liu Daoheng episode, they insist that judgment of the historical role of Du Wenxiu and the Yunnan Moslem Rebellion hinges not on the truth or otherwise of Liu Daoheng's mission as it appears in the records. They contend that the issue is a much larger one — one of historical double standards. They point out that Du Wenxiu was condemned for doing no more, even if he did do it, than many other revolutionaries in modern times. Yet these have been praised for conspiring with their actual and potential enemies in their attempt to overthrow their own government often at great damage of their country. These colleagues further maintain that in order to save his people from extermination, Du Wenxiu would have been completely justified in doing what he was accused of having done. His actions would not have been a betrayal, except to chauvinistic feeling, which had itself already betrayed him and his people.

I want to make it very clear that I do not subscribe to that proposition. I am also sure that the Moslems of Yunnan would not subscribe to it either. Nor indeed would have Du Wenxiu and those who perished with him, for instead of running for foreign protection, did they not choose rather to face up to the foreign guns which the Qing government brought against them, and fight and die as defenders of what they saw as a righteous cause? Du Wenxiu, and even Liu Daoheng, had not underestimated the intensions of the imperialist powers to make use of ethnic conflict as a divisive means to weaken the Chinese nation. History has proved that this mischief did indeed do China great harm. It is in this light that we should try to view any hasty judgement on Du Wenxiu and the Yunnan Moslem Rebellion he led, a judgement which speaks more of the political climate of the time in which it was made than of history.

I am pleased, as no doubt you are too, that China has returned once more to an atmosphere which allows an historian like myself to examine facts as facts. I hope the few facts I have put before you will help towards the vindication of the name of Du Wenxiu and the cause



of the Rebellion he led, and to their rehabilitation — such as has happened with the rehabilitation of many who were wrongly accused during that unhappy period in China's recent past. I further hope that this re-interpretation may contribute to improve relations between ethnic groups in Yunnan, so that the tragic events of the last century may never recur.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> G.E. Morrison, *An Australian in China*, London, 1902, p. 145.
- <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.
- <sup>3</sup> Yan Zhongping, *Zhongguo Jindai Jingji Shi Ziliao Xuanji*, Peking, 1955, p. 367; *Zu Yunnan Tongzhi Gao*, Kunming, 1901, ch. 35, pp. 4-13.
- <sup>4</sup> *Jindai Shi Ziliao*, vol. 3, Peking, 1958, p. 27.
- <sup>5</sup> Doudart de Lagrée et Francis Garnier, *Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine Effectué Pendant les Années 1866, 1867 et 1869*, vol. 1, Paris, 1873, pp. 455-457.
- <sup>6</sup> *Yuanshi* (Er Shi Wu Shi edition) Shanghai, 1934, ch. 103, p. 273; C. D'ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols, depuis Tchinguiz Khan jusqu' à Timour Bey ou Tamerlan*, vol. 1, La haye et Amsterdam, 1834-1835, pp. 216-323.
- <sup>7</sup> *Yuanshi*, ch. 10, p. 28, the 16th year of Zhiyuan; ch. 120, p. 298, Biography of Zhen Hai.
- <sup>8</sup> Al-Mas 'udi, *Kitab Muruj al-Dhahab wa Ma adin al Jawhar*, vol. 1, Paris, 1962, p. 125; Gabriel Ferrand, *Voyage du Marchand Arabe Sulayman en Inde et Chine redigé en 851; suivi de Remarques par Abu Zayd Hasan (vers 916)*, Paris, 1922, pp. 75-76.
- <sup>9</sup> *Taizu Shilu*, ch. 30, p. 10a.
- <sup>10</sup> *Da Min Huidian* (1587 edition), ch. 20, p. 21a; ch. 163, p. 22b.
- <sup>11</sup> *Taizu Shilu*, ch. 109, p. 4a-b.
- <sup>12</sup> *Xihu Youlan Zhi*, ch. 18; *Zhengjiang Zhi* (1333 edition), ch. 3, pp. 14-16.
- <sup>13</sup> *Huimin Qiyi*, book 1, Shanghai, 1953, p. 7.
- <sup>14</sup> Bai Shouyi et al., *Huihui Minzu de Lishi he Xianzhuang*, Peking, 1957, pp. 16-17.
- <sup>15</sup> Bai Shoyi, *Huihui Minzu de Xinsheng*, Peking, 1951, pp. 27-28.
- <sup>16</sup> *Zuo Wenxiang Gong Quanji*, Zougai ch. 36, Shoufu Huimin Ancha Gengken Pian, submitted at the 18th day of the seventh moon of the 9th year of Tongzhi.
- <sup>17</sup> *Huihui Minzu de Lishi he Xianzhuang*, p. 11.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*



- <sup>19</sup> *Yuanshi*, ch. 25, p. 67, the second year of Yanyou; Xia Guangnan, *Yuandai Yunnan Shidi Congkao*, Shanghai, 1935, pp. 154-155, 159-160.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, ch. 125, p. 307, Biography of Sai Dian Chi.
- <sup>21</sup> *Dali Xian Zhi Gao* (1916 edition), ch. 24, p. 42.
- <sup>22</sup> *Huimin Qiyi*, book 2, p. 219.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, book 2, p. 305; Hao Zhangling, *Naian Cungao*, 'Zouyi', ch. 12, p. 54.
- <sup>24</sup> *Huihui Minzu de Xinsheng*, p. 20.
- <sup>25</sup> *Dengchuan Zhou Zhi* (1854 edition), ch. 4, p. 1-2.
- <sup>26</sup> *Huimin Qiyi*, book 1, pp. 7, 251-252, 305; M. de Thiersant, *Le Mahometism en Chine*, vol. 1, Paris, 1878, p. 122; Marshall Broomhall, *Islam in China, A Neglected Problem*, London, 1910, p. 129.
- <sup>27</sup> *Huihui Minzu de Xinsheng*, pp. 53-63.
- <sup>28</sup> Fan Wenlan, *Zhongguo Jindai Shi*, book 1, Peking, 1955, p. 162.
- <sup>29</sup> William Gill, *The River of Golden Sand*, vol. 1, London, 1880, p. 304.
- <sup>30</sup> J. Talboy Wheeler, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, to C.U. Aitchison, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Rangoon, 24th February, 1872: see India Office, Political and Secret Department, *Letters to India, Madras, Bombay, Aden, Persian Gulf and Zanzibar*, 1872, vol. 4, no. 165-59p. (Hereinafter cited as *Letters to India*.)
- <sup>31</sup> *Huimin Qiyi*, book 1, pp. 165-170.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 221-225, 228; *Tengyu Ting Zhi* (1887 edition), ch. 11, p.13a-b. Diary of the Officiating Assistant Political Agent, Bhamo, 16th, 26th, 31st, January, 1872: see India Office, *Proceedings in the Foreign Department, Political*, vol. 765, April, 1872, pp. 303-304. (Hereinafter cited as *Political Proceedings*.)
- <sup>33</sup> *Letters to India*, vol. 4, nos. 198-272 HHp; Diary of the Officiating Assistant Political Agent, Bhamo, 15th, 18th, November, 1871, see *Political Proceedings*, vol. 764, April, 1872, p. 195, 197.
- <sup>34</sup> J. Talboy Wheeler, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, to C.U. Aitchison, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Rangoon, 13th April, 1872: see *Political Proceedings*, vol. 764, May, 1872, pp. 279-280.



<sup>35</sup> 'His Majesty entered fully into the subject of trade with China and hostilities between the Chinese and the Panthay, saying how his sympathies were with the former, and that if he had to give assistance to one side or the other, that assistance should be given to the Chinese.' *Diary of the Political Agent, Mandalay*, 6th August, 1872: see *Political Proceedings*, vol. 768, March, 1873, p. 65.

<sup>36</sup> 'It must be borne in mind that the Panthay Envoys have to encounter in this country a very formidable rivalry in the Burmese Embassy, the magnificence of which must throw into the shade the less splendid representatives of the Panthay power.' 'Our readers have probably been at a loss to understand how this communication between a semi-barbarous Asiatic tribe and the English government can have become, as we have lately reminded, a subject of serious controversy in India.' See *London Times*, lead article, 24th September, 1872. See also, Maung Htin Aung, 'First Burmese Mission to the Court of St James, Kinwan Mingyi's Diaries 1872-74', *Journal of the Burma Research Society*, vol. 62, pts 1-2, December 1874, pp. 43, 70-71.

<sup>37</sup> *Letters to India*, vol. 4, no. 201.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, nos. 272, 272X, 272Y, 272Z.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, nos. 171, 272SS, 272YY, 272BBB, 272DDD, 272VW.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, nos. 273A, 273B, 273E-F, 273P, 273Q.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 221.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, nos. 235, 243.

<sup>43</sup> Lou Ergang, 'Tu Wenxiu "Maiguo" shuo Pi Miu', in *Xueshu Yuekan*, Shanghai, April, 1980, p. 1.

<sup>44</sup> *Huimin Qiyi*, book 2, pp. 183-200.

<sup>45</sup> *Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine Effectué Pendant Les Années 1866, 1867 et 1868*, vol. 1, p. 513.

<sup>46</sup> Edward B. Sladen, *Official Narrative of the Expedition to Explore the Trade Route to China via Bhamo, Selections from the Records of the Government of India*, Foreign Department, no. 78, Calcutta, 1870, pp. 184-185, Appendix pp. xi-xiii.

<sup>47</sup> *Cen Xiangqin Gong Nianpu*, ch. 3, p. 116.

<sup>48</sup> *Qinding Pingding Yunnan Huifei Fanglüe*, ch. 14, pp. 7-8; ch. 16, p. 10. *Muzong Shilu*, ch. 26, p. 69.



<sup>49</sup> *Annales de la Propagation de la Foi*, vol. 43, 1871, p. 103. 'It would appear from what the Chinese officers and the Panthay officer (lately arrived from Tali) told me yesterday, that 3 Europeans were engaged during the attack on Tali, in direction artillery operation, and that the success obtained by the Chinese is greatly due to the skill with which the guns were laid, and the bombardment carried out.' See Diary of the Assistant Political Agent, Bhamo, 8th May, 1873, in India Office, Secret Letters from India, vol. 14, pt 4, 1873, p. 725.

<sup>50</sup> Wang Shuhuai, *Xian Tong Yunnan Huimin Shibian*, Taipei, 1968, pp. 279-280.

<sup>51</sup> *Political Proceedings*, vol. 768, March, 1873, no. 1369.



## THE GEORGE ERNEST MORRISON

### LECTURE IN ETHNOLOGY

The George Ernest Morrison Lecture was founded by Chinese residents in Australia and others in honour of the late Dr G.E. Morrison, a native of Geelong, Victoria, Australia.

The objects of the foundation of the lectureship were to honour for all time the memory of a great Australian who rendered valuable services to China, and to improve cultural relations between China and Australia. The foundation of the lectureship had the official support of the Chinese Consulate-General, and was due in particular to the efforts of Mr William Liu, merchant, of Sydney; Mr William Ah Ket, barrister, of Melbourne; Mr F.J. Quinlan and Sir Colin MacKenzie, of Canberra. From the time of its inception until 1948 the lecture was associated with the Australian Institute of Anatomy, but in the latter year the responsibility for the management of the lectureship was taken over by the Australian National University, and the lectures delivered since that date have been given under the auspices of the University.

*The following lectures have been delivered:*

Inaugural: W.P. Chen, *The Objects of the Foundation of the Lectureship and a review of Dr Morrison's Life in China*. 10 May 1932.

Second: W. Ah Ket, *Eastern Thought, with More Particular Reference to Confucius*. 3 May 1933.

Third: J.S. MacDonald, *The History and Development of Chinese Art*. 3 May 1934.

Fourth: W.P. Chen, *The New Culture Movement in China*. 10 May 1935.

Fifth: Wu Lien-teh, *Reminiscences of George E. Morrison; and Chinese Abroad*. 2 September 1936.

Sixth: Chun-jien Pai, *China Today: With Special Reference to Higher Education*. 4 May 1937.

Seventh: A.F. Barker, *The Impact of Western Industrialism on China*. 17 May 1939.

Eighth: S.H. Roberts, *The Gifts of the Old China to the New*. 5 June 1939.

Ninth: Howard Mowll, *West China as Seen Through the Eyes of the Westerner*. 29 May 1949.

Tenth: W.G. Goddard, *The Ming Shen. A Study in Chinese Democracy*. 5 June 1941.

- Eleventh: D.B. Copland, *The Chinese Social Structure*. 27 September 1948.\*
- Twelfth: J.K. Rideout, *Politics in Medieval China*. 28 October 1949.
- Thirteenth: C.P. FitzGerald, *The Revolutionary Tradition in China*. 19 March 1951.
- Fourteenth: H.V. Evatt, *Some Aspects of Morrison's Life and Work*. 4 December 1952.
- Fifteenth: Lord Lindsay of Birker, *China and the West*. 20 October 1953.
- Sixteenth: M. Titiev, *Chinese Elements in Japanese Culture*. 27 July 1954.
- Seventeenth: H. Bielenstein, *Emperor Kuang-Wu (A.D.25-27) and the Northern Barbarians*. 2 November 1955.\*
- Eighteenth: Leonard B. Cox, *The Buddhist Temples of Yun-Kang and Lung-Men*. 17 October 1956.\*
- Nineteenth: Otto P.N. Berkelbach van der Sprenkel, *The Chinese Civil Service*. 4 November 1957.
- Twentieth: A.R. Davies, *The Narrow Lane: Some Observations on the Recluse in Traditional Chinese Society*. 19 November 1958.
- Twenty-first: C.N. Spinks, *The Khmer Temple of Prah Vihar*. 6 October 1959.\*
- Twenty-second: Chen Chih-mai, *Chinese Landscape Painting: The Golden Age*. 5 October 1960.\*
- Twenty-third: L. Carrington Goodrich, *China's Contacts with Other Parts of Asia in Ancient Times*. 1 August 1961.\*
- Twenty-fourth: N.G.D. Malmqvist, *Problems and Methods in Chinese Linguistics*. 22 November 1962.\*
- Twenty-fifth: H.F. Simon, *Some Motivations of Chinese Foreign Policy*. 3 October 1963.
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- Twenty-ninth: J.D. Frodsham, *New Perspectives in Chinese Literature*. 23 July 1968.\*
- Thirtieth: E.A. Huck, *The Assimilation of the Chinese in Australia*. 6 November 1969.\*



- Thirty-first: K.A. Wittfogel, *Agriculture: A Key to the Understanding of Chinese Society, Past and Present*. 6 April 1970.\*
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